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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this diversity action, we are asked to predict certain 
parameters of the employment-at-will doctrine under 
Delaware law. Relying on the "public policy exception" to 
the doctrine, plaintiff claimed he was unlawfully terminated 
for protesting his employer's illegal billing scheme. After a 
jury rendered a verdict for plaintiff, defendant employer 
moved for judgment as a matter of law or, in the 
alternative, a new trial. The district court denied both 
motions. Paolella v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 973 F. Supp. 508, 
510 (E.D. Pa. 1997). We will affirm. 
 
I. 
 
In October 1989, Michael Paolella began working as a 
sales supervisor for Browning-Ferris, Inc. in its office in 
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania. In February 1990, Paolella 
was promoted to sales supervisor and transferred to BFI's 
Wilmington, Delaware division. His responsibilities included 
servicing existing commercial waste disposal accounts and 
obtaining new business for BFI. Paolella soon developed 
and instituted a marketing plan which resulted in 
increased profits for the Delaware division. At the start of 
the next fiscal year, October 1, 1990, Paolella was promoted 
to sales manager. 
 
BFI's customer relationships were governed by service 
agreements, which usually ran for a three year term and 
provided for a flat monthly billing rate. Although the 
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customer was only informed of the bottom line figure, the 
billing rate was actually comprised of two separate 
components: a service fee, representing the cost of 
collecting and transporting the trash to the landfill each 
week, and a disposal fee, representing the cost of dumping 
the trash at the landfill. While the monthly rate was based 
on the volume of the customer's trash, measured in cubic 
yards, the state-run landfill charged BFI based on the 
weight of the trash dumped. Consequently, BFI based the 
disposal portion of its contract price on an average weight 
of 90 pounds per cubic yard. The service agreements 
allowed BFI to increase the monthly rate in three ways: 
1) BFI could pass along state increases in dumping  costs at 
the landfill; 2) BFI could impose cost-of-living  increases on 
the service fee; or 3) BFI could increase the rate  in other 
situations, provided it gave the customer 30 days advance 
notice and received customer consent.1  
 
In late 1991, the Delaware Solid Waste Authority 
announced plans to increase landfill disposal rates by 25%, 
effective July 1, 1992. Ronald Hanley, BFI's Delaware 
District manager, discussed the rate increase at a January 
1992 sales meeting, and announced two changes in BFI's 
billing procedures. First, he unveiled a new invoicing 
system to begin February 1, 1992, whereby customer 
invoices would display both the disposal fee and the service 
fee. This would allow customers to see that the impending 
25% fee increase was the result of the state's increased 
disposal fees, rather than an increase in BFI's service 
charges. 
 
According to Paolella, Hanley also announced a plan to 
increase the disposal fee artificially by assigning a new 
average weight of 120 pounds per cubic yard, and 
decreasing the service fee by a corresponding amount. The 
initial result of this modification was that the customer 
would continue to pay the same flat monthly fee. But once 
the state imposed 25% increase in dumping costs took 
effect, BFI would earn additional profits because that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Explicit, written consent was not required. The agreement provided a 
"[c]ustomer's consent may be evidenced by the practices and action of 
the parties." App. at 788. 
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increase would be applied to the artificially inflated average 
weight of 120 pounds per cubic yard. While the total 
amount of the increase would be disclosed under the new 
billing system, the customer would assume the full increase 
was attributable to the state imposed increase in disposal 
charges. 
 
Acknowledging he did not object to the plan at the 
meeting, Paolella testified at trial that he subsequently 
raised concerns about the legality of the rate increase with 
Hanley at least twice weekly, from January through April 
1992, during their daily commute. Paolella also testified he 
raised similar concerns with Fred Snyder, BFI's vice- 
president for the Atlantic region, during a private meeting 
in April 1992.2 According to Paolella, both men dismissed 
his protests, and Snyder advised Paolella to do as Hanley 
instructed.3 Despite his objections, in June 1992 Paolella 
complied with instructions to draft a letter to all BFI 
customers advising them of the 25% increase.4 He also 
negotiated contracts with customers based on the new 
rates. 
 
Paolella testified that, in November 1992, a customer, 
Edwin DeSeta, advised him that a BFI competitor had 
offered a better rate. After a weight study of DeSeta's trash 
indicated that it weighed much less than the average weight 
of 120 pounds per cubic yard, Paolella asked Hanley if BFI 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Both Snyder and Hanley testified that Paolella did not lodge any 
objections with them. App. at 353 (Snyder); App. at 526-27 (Hanley). 
 
3. The day after this discussion with Snyder, Hanley instructed Paolella 
not to send a previously approved mass mailing informing customers 
they could reduce their disposal costs by increased recycling. According 
to Paolella, Hanley's explanation for the decision to cancel the mailing 
was that "you [Paolella] don't work the BFI way." 
 
4. The notice explained the impending rate hike as follows: 
 
       Effective July 1, 1992 there will be an increase in the fees that 
the 
       Delaware Solid Waste Authority charges for all solid waste disposal 
       at its landfill. 
 
       Therefore, BFI must increase its charge for solid waste removal. 
This 
       will take effect with our July 1992 invoicing. 
 
App. at 805. 
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could reduce DeSeta's rate. According to Paolella and his 
subordinate, Geoffrey Schenck, Hanley instructed them to 
inform DeSeta that his trash weighed 120 pounds and the 
rate could not be reduced. Paolella then instructed Schenck 
to explain this to DeSeta. Paolella testified he complied 
because he feared losing his job. One month later, Paolella 
was replaced by Stephen Stanko as sales manager. Despite 
not having received any prior written warning or other 
indication that his performance was unsatisfactory, Paolella 
was demoted to sales representative. 
 
Paolella also testified to two other instances of fraudulent 
billing by BFI. First, Paolella testified that in 1993 he 
discovered BFI had increased its weight disposal fee for 
Dempsey's Diner, claiming the average weight of Dempsey's 
trash was 200 pounds. Although Dempsey's contract did 
not permit BFI to increase its fees based on an increase in 
the trash weight, Dempsey's agreed to pay the higher rate 
if BFI could substantiate the weight increase. According to 
Paolella, Stanko directed Paolella to prepare three false 
weight tickets. Paolella testified he did as directed because 
he feared repercussions if he disobeyed. 
 
Second, Paolella testified that he learned BFI was 
continuing to bill Fayva Shoes, although Fayva had stopped 
using BFI's services some months earlier. When Paolella 
suggested to Hanley that Fayva should receive a credit for 
the overpayments, Hanley told him, "as long as they keep 
paying us, you keep billing them." 
 
In late 1993, the tension between Paolella and BFI 
reached a breaking point. On August 27, 1993, Paolella 
sent BFI a certified letter concerning unpaid commissions 
he claimed BFI owed him. On September 24, 1993, BFI 
sent Paolella a written warning about his performance. On 
December 2, 1993, Paolella sent BFI another letter about 
the commissions. BFI replied by sending Paolella another 
warning on December 23, 1993. Paolella then sent BFI two 
more letters on December 30, 1993. In one of them, 
Paolella warned BFI to "immediately cease all illegal 
activities," a statement he claimed referred to Hanley's 
fraudulent billing scheme. On January 17, 1994, BFI 
terminated Paolella for "poor performance." 
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II. 
 
On December 6, 1994, Paolella filed a complaint against 
BFI and its parent company, Browning-Ferris Industries, 
Inc., alleging wrongful discharge.5 After a four day trial, the 
jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and awarded 
$732,000 in damages. At the court's request, the jury 
specified that $135,000 represented back pay, while the 
remaining $597,000 constituted front pay. BFI filed a 
renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and, in the 
alternative, a motion for a new trial.6  As noted, the district 
court denied both motions. 
 
III. 
 
The district court examined Delaware case law to 
determine whether whistleblowing employees were entitled 
to protection under the public policy exception to the 
employment-at-will doctrine. Finding no cases directly on 
point, the court predicted whether the Delaware Supreme 
Court would afford such protection. Based primarily on its 
interpretation of the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in 
E.I. Dupont de Nemours and Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436 
(Del. 1996), the district court held Delaware would extend 
the protection of the public policy exception to an employee 
who "blew the whistle" on an employer's illegal (as opposed 
to merely questionable) conduct. Paolella, 973 F. Supp. at 
512. 
 
The court then examined whether there was sufficient 
evidence to support the jury's finding that BFI had engaged 
in illegal activity. Citing Paolella's testimony concerning 
Hanley's creation of the fraudulent billing scheme, Hanley's 
instructions to lie to customer DeSeta, Stanko's 
instructions to fabricate weight tickets, and the 
corroboration of much of Paolella's testimony by Schenck, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The claims against Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc. were dismissed for 
lack of personal jurisdiction. 
 
6. BFI also moved the district court to amend the judgment to indicate 
the jury's apportionment of the verdict to front pay and back pay. The 
district court granted that motion, and none of the parties has appealed 
this determination. 
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the court concluded the evidence was sufficient. The court 
also found the public policy exception could still apply even 
if Paolella participated in the unlawful activity: "[t]o 
preclude even a penny of recovery to a whistleblower 
plaintiff because that plaintiff had some slight participation 
in that wrongdoing would be a disincentive to rooting out 
corruption, and would mute more than a few whistles." Id. 
Drawing an analogy to the concept of comparative fault in 
negligence, the district court held that, although the 
Delaware courts would not create an absolute bar to 
recovery, some reduction in the jury verdict was 
appropriate because of Paolella's participation. 7 
Consequently, the court ordered a remittitur of $132,000. 
 
The district court also rejected BFI's argument that there 
was insufficient evidence of causation because considerable 
time had elapsed between Paolella's complaints and his 
termination. Although BFI contended the letters sent by 
Paolella did not address the fraudulent billing scheme, the 
court found the jury could have reasonably concluded the 
reference to "illegal activity" in Paolella's December 30, 
1993 letter was part of his protests to BFI. Because BFI 
terminated Paolella less than a month after receiving the 
letter, the court concluded that causation was adequately 
proven. 
 
With respect to the motion for a new trial, the court 
rejected the argument that its charge improperly instructed 
the jury on the issue of reliance. In particular, BFI claimed 
the charge allowed the jury to infer that BFI's customers 
relied on the alleged misrepresentations, despite the 
absence of any direct testimony from BFI's customers. 
According to BFI, this relieved Paolella of his burden of 
proving reliance, and placed the onus on BFI to disprove 
that its customers relied on the alleged misrepresentations. 
The court disagreed, holding the charge instructed the jury 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The court rejected Paolella's argument that no reduction in the 
damage award was warranted because he was "coerced" into 
participating because he feared losing his job: "[t]hat one needs money, 
that one will suffer economic hardship if one does not play along with a 
scheme to skim from one's customers, has never been a defense to 
fraud." Paolella, 973 F. Supp. at 513. 
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that it could infer customer reliance on BFI's statements "if 
there were sufficient circumstances to permit that inference 
to be drawn." Id. at 514. The court reasoned that, despite 
the absence of direct customer testimony, the jury could 
reasonably infer that a customer would not accept an 
unwarranted price increase if it were fully informed of the 
basis for that increase. Id. at 514 ("It is a matter of common 
sense, and of general knowledge of human nature, that 
people are not inclined knowingly to consent to being 
economically gouged."). 
 
IV. 
 
BFI appeals on several grounds. First, BFI contends the 
district court misinterpreted Delaware case law and 
improperly extended the scope of the "public policy 
exception" to include situations where the employee was 
directly involved in the allegedly illegal activity. Second, BFI 
argues that, regardless whether an employee's involvement 
bars his recovery, this case does not fit within the 
parameters of the public policy exception because Paolella 
was not responsible for the allegedly unlawful activity, and 
did not produce sufficient evidence at trial, in particular 
testimony from BFI's customers, to prove that BFI's 
conduct was illegal. Third, BFI contends Paolella failed to 
prove his opposition to BFI's billing scheme was the cause 
of his termination. Finally, BFI claims the court erred when 
it found sufficient evidence to support the jury award, and 
contests the court's application of comparative fault 
principles in the context of a wrongful discharge action. 
 
We exercise plenary review of the district court's denial of 
a motion for judgment as a matter of law, Lightning Lube, 
Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993), as 
well as its predictions applying state law. Staff Builders of 
Phila., Inc. v. Koschitzki, 989 F.2d 692, 694 (3d Cir. 1993). 
A motion for judgment as a matter of law should be granted 
only if, "viewing all the evidence . . . in the light most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion, no jury could 
decide in that party's favor." Walter v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 
985 F.2d 1232, 1238 (3d Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). 
 
We review the district court's denial of a motion for a new 
trial for abuse of discretion, "unless the court's denial of the 
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motion is based on the application of a legal precept, in 
which case the standard of review is plenary." Rotondo v. 
Keene Corp., 956 F.2d 436, 438 (3d Cir. 1992). A question 
of fact concerning the new trial motion is reviewed for clear 
error. United States v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967, 969 (3d Cir. 
1991). The district court's grant of remittitur is also 
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Dunn v. Hovic, 1 F.3d 
1362, 1364 (3d Cir.), modified on other grounds, 13 F.3d 58 
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1031 (1993). Finally, we 
review BFI's challenge to the amount of the jury award to 
determine if "the verdict is `so grossly excessive as to shock 
the judicial conscience.' " Gumbs v. Pueblo Int'l Inc., 823 
F.2d 768, 771 (3d Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). 
 
V. 
 
A district court exercising diversity jurisdiction must 
apply the substantive law of the state whose law governs 
the action. Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 79 F.3d 1358, 
1373 n.15 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 
304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)). "When the state's highest court 
has not addressed the precise question presented, a federal 
court must predict how the state's highest court would 
resolve the issue." Id. Absent a definitive statement of the 
applicable law by the state's highest court, a district court 
may also consider the decisions of state intermediate 
appellate courts in order to facilitate its prediction. Rolick v. 
Collins Pine Co., 925 F.2d 661, 664 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. 
denied, 507 U.S. 973 (1993). 
 
A. 
 
1. 
 
The employment-at-will doctrine "has a long history in 
Delaware and the United States." E.I. Dupont de Nemours 
and Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 440 (Del. 1996). Under 
the doctrine, there is a "heavy presumption that a contract 
for employment, unless otherwise expressly stated, is at- 
will in nature, with duration indefinite." Merrill v. Crothall- 
American, Inc., 606 A.2d. 96, 102 (Del. 1992). But the 
doctrine is not entirely unfettered, and courts have 
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demonstrated a willingness to "impos[e] constraints on an 
expansive interpretation of employers' prerogatives under at 
will employment contracts . . . ." Shearin v. E.F. Hutton 
Group, Inc., 652 A.2d 578, 586 (Del. Ch. 1994). In 
particular, Delaware courts have established two distinct 
limitations on the employment-at-will doctrine, one 
grounded in contract, the other in public policy. 
 
The contractual limitation adopted by the Delaware 
Supreme Court in Merrill, based on an implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, bars termination in cases of 
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation by the employer. 606 
A.2d at 101-02. Although the facts of that case did not 
require the court to address the availability of other 
exceptions to the at-will doctrine, the court noted that, in 
certain circumstances, "some other public policy [may be] 
implicated" by an employee's termination. Id. at 102. 
 
The Delaware Court of Chancery later applied this "public 
policy" exception in the case of an in-house attorney who 
was allegedly fired for attempting to expose various abuses 
by her employer's corporate parent. See Shearin v. E.F. 
Hutton Group, Inc., 652 A.2d 578, 586 (Del. Ch. 1994). 
Delving into uncharted territory, the Chancellor held that 
an at-will employee may state a valid claim for breach of 
her employment contract where her termination was in 
violation of a "specific, articulated public policy." Id. But the 
court held this exception was limited in two respects. 
"[E]mployees who seek protection from firing on the basis 
that their actions were protected by a public policy, must 
assert a public interest recognized by some legislative, 
administrative or judicial authority, and the employee must 
occupy a position with responsibility for that particular 
interest." Id. at 587-88. 
 
The Delaware Supreme Court again took up the public 
policy exception in Pressman. In that case, plaintiff 
Pressman discovered that his superior, Pensak, was serving 
as a technical adviser to a medical imaging technology 
company, a position Pressman feared created a conflict of 
interest. Pressman alleged that, after confronting his 
superior, Pensak engaged in a retaliatory campaign to have 
him fired. Defendant DuPont contended that the 
employment-at-will doctrine barred Pressman's suit. While 
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the court's analysis focused primarily on the applicability of 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing set forth in 
Merrill, it also examined the public policy exception to the 
at-will doctrine, but concluded that Pressman's claim did 
not satisfy the requirements established in Shearin. 
 
The central question raised here is whether Delaware 
would apply the public policy exception in a situation where 
the employee has participated in the employer's illegal 
activity. BFI argues that, under Delaware law, the public 
policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine is 
narrow. In addition to the limitations prescribed by Shearin, 
BFI contends that Pressman limits the application of the 
exception to those cases in which the employee refuses to 
participate in the illegal activity. 
 
We disagree. We do not believe Pressman adds a "non- 
participation" requirement to the public policy exception 
delineated in Shearin. Although the Pressman court quoted 
approvingly from Shearin, noting the limitations set forth, it 
did not address whether an employee's participation would 
prevent his recovery for wrongful discharge.8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. BFI argues that Pressman "emphasized, by its own description, that 
the exception will only protect employees who refuse to participate in 
unlawful conduct." BFI Brief at 15 (citing Pressman, 679 A.2d at 441-42 
& n.13). That "description" appears to be the parenthetical description of 
a Superior Court case cited in a Pressman footnote, in which the 
Delaware Supreme Court described the Superior Court's holding with the 
phrase "refusing to commit crime." Pressman, 679 A.2d at 442 n.13 
(citing Henze v. Alloy Surfaces Co., Inc., C.A. No. 91C-06-20, 1992 WL 
51861, Bifferato, J. (Del Super. Ct., March 16, 1992)). BFI interprets 
this 
to mean the public policy exception only applies if the employee refuses 
to participate in the employer's criminal act. 
 
We disagree with BFI's interpretation. The Delaware Supreme Court 
cited that case for the proposition that "[t]he Superior Court has . . . 
permitted an exception to the at-will rule for public policy." Pressman, 
679 A.2d at 442 n.13. The use of the phrase "refusing to commit crime" 
is a description of the factual premise of the case, and cannot be read 
to limit an employee's recovery to instances where the employee 
refrained from participating in its employer's unlawful activity. Any 
doubt as to the weight to be afforded this parenthetical description can 
be eliminated by consideration of the next Superior Court case in that 
citation string, which is described with the phrase "refusing to take 
polygraph." 
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Despite the absence of explicit language in Pressman 
adopting this "non-participation" requirement, BFI presses 
its argument by noting that none of the "plaintiffs in the 
cases cited as authority in Pressman would have stated a 
valid cause of action under the public policy exception had 
he or she not refused to violate the law." BFI Brief at 18. 
But, once again, these cases give no indication that the 
application of the public policy exception turned on the 
employee's refusal to violate the law. BFI has cited no case 
in which a Delaware court has refused to apply the public 
policy exception because an employee was involved in the 
illegal activity at the direction of its employer. Since neither 
Pressman nor Shearin conditioned the applicability of the 
public policy exception on the employee's abstention from 
the employer's wrongdoing, we believe the district court's 
prediction of Delaware law is correct. As the district court 
noted, "[i]n the real world, it is a fact that not every 
observer of less-than-licit conduct is a third party, coyly 
standing an innocent and proper distance away from the 
misdeeds." Paolella, 973 F. Supp. at 512. Although the 
exceptions to the at-will doctrine are to be narrowly drawn, 
the policy reasons for protecting whistleblowers remain 
whether or not the employee can avoid involvement in the 
illegal activity. For these reasons, we do not believe a non- 
participation requirement is mandated by Delaware law. 
 
2. 
 
BFI also contends the public policy exception does not 
apply to the facts of this case. As noted in Shearin, an 
employee seeking protection from the public policy 
exception "must assert a public interest recognized by some 
legislative, administrative or judicial authority, and must 
occupy a position with responsibility for that particular 
interest." 652 A.2d at 587-88. According to BFI, Paolella's 
complaints did not address a specific public interest, and 
even if so, he was not in a position of responsibility to 
warrant the protection of the public policy exception. BFI 
maintains that "Pressman authoritatively establishes that 
questioning the propriety of the employer's business 
practices . . . `does not rise to the level of a legally 
cognizable public policy exception.' " BFI Brief at 14. Under 
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this view, Paolella's private objections to Hanley and Snyder 
do not bring his termination within the scope of the 
exception. 
 
In Pressman, the court found the employee's claim that 
he was fired for questioning the propriety of his superior's 
business practices was outside the purview of the public 
policy exception. 679 A.2d at 442 (holding that "Pressman's 
claim cannot fit within the public policy category since he 
does not identify an explicit and recognizable public 
policy."). In particular, the court noted that " `[e]mployees 
who uncover and blow the whistle on questionable internal 
financial and business practices [absent illegality] have won 
no support from the courts.' " 679 A.2d 436, 442 (alteration 
in original) (quoting Holloway & Leech, Employment 
Termination: Rights and Remedies 180 (2d ed. 1993)). 
Consequently, it appears that Delaware will not invoke the 
public policy exception absent some illegal act by the 
employer. 
 
Once that limitation is understood, Pressman can be 
distinguished on its facts. The plaintiff in Pressman 
questioned the ethical propriety of his superior's 
relationship with a client of the company. By contrast, 
Paolella contended that his employers' billing scheme was 
illegally designed to defraud BFI's customers by leading 
them to believe the increase in their monthly fees was due 
solely to a state imposed increase in BFI's dumping costs 
and was therefore authorized under the terms of the service 
agreements. Thus, while both Paolella and Pressman 
questioned the propriety of their employer's business 
practices, Paolella raised legal, as opposed to ethical, 
concerns about his employer's conduct. 
 
BFI also claims the public policy exception is inapplicable 
because Paolella did not have responsibility for the 
company's billing policies. We disagree. As the record 
shows, Paolella was a sales manager at the time of the 
allegedly unlawful billing practices and was responsible for 
negotiating service contracts, billing BFI's customers, and 
handling customer complaints. Although the case law does 
not elucidate the level of "responsibility" an employee must 
have in order to qualify under the public policy exception, 
we believe Paolella's position as sales manager puts him in 
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a position of responsibility sufficient to invoke its 
protection. 
 
Consequently, we believe the district court, in predicting 
Delaware law, correctly found the public policy exception 
applicable under the facts of this case. 
 
B. 
 
BFI's contends that, even if the public policy exception 
applies, the evidence was insufficient to support a finding 
that its conduct was illegal. Consistent with its 
interpretation of Delaware law, the district court charged 
the jury that, in order to find for Paolella, it must find BFI 
had violated Delaware's theft by false pretenses statute. 
That statute provides: 
 
       A person commits theft when, with the intent 
       prescribed in S 841 of this title [to deprive another 
       person of property or to appropriate another person's 
       property], the person obtains property of another 
       person by intentionally creating or reinforcing a false 
       impression as to a present or past fact, or by 
       preventing the other person from acquiring information 
       which would adversely affect the other person's 
       judgment of a transaction. 
 
11 Del. Code S 843 (1998). The district court held there was 
sufficient evidence to allow a jury to find BFI violated the 
theft by false pretenses statute because BFI "had obtained 
greater fees, the property of others, by creating a false 
impression that the rate increase reflected higher landfill 
costs alone." Paolella, 973 F. Supp. at 511. 
 
On appeal, BFI maintains the actions alleged by Paolella 
did not violate Delaware law.9 BFI contends that it did not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. BFI urges us to find that its actions were not illegal as a matter of 
law, 
reasoning that our decision in Clark v. Modern Group Ltd., 9 F.3d 321 
(3d Cir. 1993), allows a court to "resolve as a matter of law whether a 
certain course of conduct to which an employee has objected is illegal." 
BFI Brief at 29. Clark is inapplicable here. In Clark, the sole issue was 
the legal question whether the tax laws required inclusion of certain 
excess expense reimbursements on employees' W-2 forms. There were no 
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mislead its customers because the bottom line rate it 
charged was fully disclosed to BFI's customers, and that 
the invoices it prepared indicated the rate increase was not 
due solely to the landfill charge increase. BFI also asserts 
that "no customer appeared to testify that he was under a 
false impression, or was prevented from acquiring 
information which would adversely affect his judgment of 
his transaction with BFI." BFI Brief at 23. Consequently, 
BFI contends that the evidence does not support afinding 
that it violated Delaware's theft by false pretenses statute. 
 
We disagree. Viewing all of the evidence presented in the 
light most favorable to Paolella, we do not believe "the 
record is critically deficient of that quantum of evidence 
from which a jury could have rationally reached its verdict." 
Swineford v. Snyder County, 15 F.3d 1258, 1265 (3d Cir. 
1994). Although Paolella did not offer the testimony of 
customers claiming they were deceived, we do not believe 
the absence of such testimony is fatal.10  As noted, there 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
factual disputes. As Clark noted, however, "a decision on the legality or 
illegality of a particular act often requires a resolution of disputed 
issues 
of fact . . . ." 9 F.3d at 333. In this instance, the determination of 
whether BFI violated 11 Del. Code S 843 necessarily turns on certain 
factual issues relating to BFI's conduct and the jury's evaluation of the 
relevant testimony. Consequently, we decline to determine this question 
as a matter of law. 
 
10. On appeal, BFI once more raises the argument that Paolella failed to 
meet his burden of demonstrating BFI's customers relied on the alleged 
misrepresentations because he presented no customer testimony at trial. 
BFI reasons that, absent direct evidence of reliance, Paolella cannot 
prove a violation of 11 Del. Code S 843. In particular, BFI maintains the 
jury charge "on a theory of a lack of informed consent allowed the jury 
to believe that without any customer testimony it could infer an 
[unlawful] act," effectively reversing the burden of proof on the issue of 
reliance. BFI Brief at 31. 
 
We do not believe the jury charge on the issue of reliance was an 
abuse of the court's discretion. The court's charge set out the arguments 
offered by both sides, and informed the jury that they should apply 
common sense and their own experience to the evidence and testimony 
presented at trial. We do not believe that allowing the jury to draw 
reasonable inferences shifted the burden of proof to BFI. To the contrary, 
Paolella had the burden of demonstrating that BFI made false 
representations to its customers regarding the nature of the impending 
price increase. 
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was testimony concerning Hanley's creation of the 
fraudulent billing scheme, Hanley's instructions to both 
Paolella and Schenck to lie to DeSeta, and the fabrication 
of the weight tickets for Dempsey's Diner. In addition, 
Paolella testified that he sent each customer, at BFI's 
direction, a memorandum stating that BFI was increasing 
its charges for solid waste disposal as a result of the 
Delaware Solid Waste Authority's increased charges to BFI. 
Taken together, we believe the jury could have reasonably 
concluded that BFI intentionally created a false impression 
among its customers that the price increase was solely the 
result of the state imposed increase in BFI's dumping costs. 
 
C. 
 
BFI also contends its actions did not violate the statute 
because it was within its contractual rights to raise the 
disposal fee. According to BFI, the agreements 
"unambiguously placed the burden of objecting to a rate 
adjustment on the customer, and expressly advised 
customers that their consent could be inferred from their 
conduct." BFI Brief at 33. Consequently, BFI argues the 
failure of the customers to object indicates their consent to 
the price increase. In the alternative, BFI argues that while 
its conduct may amount to a breach of contract, this does 
not constitute an illegal act that would trigger the 
protection of the public policy exception. 
 
We do not believe that BFI's actions can only be classified 
as a breach of contract. As the district court noted, a 
breach of contract can be accompanied by other actions 
that violate the law. That BFI's actions may constitute a 
breach of its service agreements does not preclude afinding 
that its accompanying actions violated Delaware's theft by 
false pretenses statute. In this instance, it is BFI's alleged 
misrepresentations to its customers, rather than its breach 
of the service agreements, which serve as the basis for a 
finding that BFI violated Delaware's theft by false pretenses 
statute. 
 
We also disagree with BFI's argument that its July 1992 
fee increase was permissible under the service agreements. 
As noted, BFI's service agreements allowed for three 
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categories of rate increases. The first two, which did not 
require customer consent, allowed BFI to raise its rates in 
order to pass along state imposed increases in dumping 
costs and to impose cost-of-living increases. The third 
category allowed BFI to raise its fees for any other reason, 
provided it gives the customer 30 days advance notice and 
received customer consent. But customer silence cannot 
constitute customer consent when the July 1992 rate 
increase was not solely attributable to the state-imposed 
increase in BFI's dumping costs.11 
 
Because the jury found that BFI intentionally misled its 
customers as to the basis for the fee increase, and because 
we believe the evidence offered at trial was sufficient to 
support such a finding, we reject BFI's arguments. 
 
D. 
 
Claiming twenty months passed between Paolella's last 
complaint in April 1992 and his termination, BFI contends 
Paolella failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating that 
his complaints of illegality were the cause of his 
termination. Furthermore, BFI contends it had good cause 
to terminate Paolella, citing his inadequate performance in 
1993 and the hostile attitude displayed in his letters to 
Stanko and Hanley. 
 
BFI's contention that twenty months passed between 
Paolella's last complaint and his termination in January 
1994 turns on its interpretation of the correspondence sent 
by Paolella in December 1993. Paolella claims that his 
December 30, 1993 letter, in which he demanded BFI 
"immediately cease all illegal activities," was a direct 
reference to BFI's fraudulent billing scheme, and his 
termination less than three weeks later is sufficient support 
for the jury's finding of causation. BFI contends that the 
"illegal activities" must refer to the alleged withholding of 
Paolella's commissions.12 We disagree. In light of Paolella's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. We also disagree with BFI's unsupported contention that it obtained 
its customers' "voluntary, informed consent" to raise its fees at the time 
the service agreements were signed. 
 
12. BFI contends that, because the letter was unambiguous, we should 
determine its meaning as a matter of law. BFI Brief at 35 (citing Western 
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repeated complaints about BFI's billing scheme, the 
reference to "illegal activities" could reasonably be 
interpreted as a reference to either BFI's billing scheme or 
its withholding of Paolella's commissions. The issue was 
properly left to the jury. See Williamson v. Consolidated Rail 
Corp., 926 F.2d 1344, 1353 (3d Cir. 1991) ("New trials 
because the verdict is against the weight of the evidence are 
proper only when the record shows that the jury's verdict 
resulted in a miscarriage of justice or where the verdict, on 
the record, cries out to be overturned or shocks our 
conscience.") 
 
BFI also claims it had good cause for terminating 
Paolella, noting Paolella conceded "the only reasons 
provided to him at the January 17, 1994 meeting as the 
reason for his discharge were his poor performance and 
attitude . . . [and therefore] established as a matter of law 
BFI's justification for terminating him for insubordination." 
BFI Brief at 38. That an employer did not provide bad faith 
or discriminatory reasons for an employee's termination 
does not insulate the employer from liability "as a matter of 
law." Consequently, BFI's argument is reduced to an attack 
on the weight the jury accorded the evidence. While 
acknowledging "BFI presented a good deal of evidence to 
the effect that Mr. Paolella was a worthy candidate for being 
sacked," the district court found there was sufficient 
evidence to support the jury's findings. Paolella, 973 F. 
Supp. at 515. We agree. Viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the verdict winner, we do not believe BFI 
has shown that no rational jury could have found for 
Paolella. 
 
E. 
 
BFI contends there was insufficient evidence to support 
the jury award of $597,000 in front pay, and contends that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
United Life Assurance Co. v. Hayden, 64 F.3d 833, 837 (3d Cir. 1995)). 
But Western United Life addressed a court's obligation to construe an 
unambiguous contract as a matter of law. The document at issue here 
was a letter, rather than a legally enforceable agreement. More 
importantly, we believe the December 30, 1993 letter was not 
unambiguous. This was a jury issue. 
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such an exorbitant award "may be indicative of passion and 
prejudice." BFI Brief at 43. In addition, BFI objects to the 
district court's application of a "comparative fault" theory, 
contending that, even if the court were correct, it should 
have submitted the calculation of comparative fault to the 
jury. 
 
With respect to the size of the jury award, BFI notes that 
Paolella did not offer expert actuarial testimony to support 
his claim, and contends the size of the award demonstrates 
the jury ignored the district court's charge.13 According to 
BFI, the front pay award is more than 17 times the 
difference between Paolella's highest annual salary and the 
$20,000 he earned the year after his termination, and is 
therefore "contrary to right reason." 
 
We disagree. The amount of the jury award in this 
instance does not shock the conscience. In addition, we do 
not believe the absence of expert testimony renders the jury 
calculation improper. Paolella presented evidence that his 
salary at BFI from 1991 through 1993 ranged from $45,000 
to $53,000 and that his earnings in 1995 were $20,000. 
Based on this information, the jury could reasonably 
calculate a front pay award according to the district court's 
instructions.14 Consequently, we do not believe the evidence 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. BFI takes no exception to the jury charge with respect to damage 
calculation. The court charged the jury: 
 
       If you determine to award damages to plaintiff, it is not 
appropriate 
       to merely award pay until such time as plaintiff qualifies for a 
       pension or otherwise might be expected to retire. Such an award in 
       pay to a 51 year old employee is unwarranted, because of future 
       uncertainties, and you must act cautiously in considering an award 
       of front pay for a long period of time. You must consider other 
       factors such as the availability of employment opportunities, the 
       period within which one by reasonable efforts may become 
       reemployed, the employee's work and life expectancy, and discount 
       tables to determine the present value of future damages, and other 
       factors that are pertinent to a prospective damage award. If you 
find 
       that plaintiff failed to present testimony and evidence regarding 
       those factors, you should not award him front pay for an extended 
       period of time. 
 
App. at 696-97. 
 
14. Assuming a fourteen year work expectancy, the front pay award 
averages out to an annual income of $ 42,642, afigure that falls between 
the highest salary Paolella had earned (over $50,000) and the $20,000 
he reportedly earned the year following his termination. 
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is insufficient to support the award, or that the jury's 
calculation is improper. 
 
With respect to calculation of an appropriate remittitur, 
BFI contends there was no basis to conclude the Delaware 
courts would apply comparative negligence principles in 
this situation, and that even if those principles applied 
here, the jury, rather than the court, should have 
determined the degree of fault attributable to both parties. 
 
We do not believe the court's analysis was an abuse of 
discretion.15 We note the district court did not actually 
apply comparative negligence principles to calculate the 
remittitur, and did not attempt to allocate degrees of fault 
between the parties. The district court reasoned that, much 
as a plaintiff in a negligence action should not be rewarded 
if he is partly at fault, an employee who participates in an 
illegal activity on behalf of his employer ought not receive 
the full benefit from his action for wrongful discharge. 
Consequently, the court concluded that the jury award 
would shock the conscience of the court unless it was 
reduced appropriately. We see no abuse of discretion here. 
 
VI. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the district 
court's denial of defendant's motion for judgment as a 
matter of law and its motion for a new trial. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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15. BFI also contends the district court's analogy to comparative 
negligence was an improper basis for the court's conclusion that an 
employee may recover for wrongful discharge under the public policy 
exception even if the employee is engaged in the illegal activity. For the 
reasons discussed supra, we believe the district court correctly predicted 
the Delaware courts would allow an employee to recover in such a case, 
and consequently need not address this argument. 
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